Inference of the Federal Reserve’s internally prepared future economic state,
based exclusively on Fed-authored projections and communications.
1. Fed-Implied Growth Outlook
The Federal Reserve appears to be preparing for a future economic state characterized by STABLE to ACCELERATING growth. For the NEAR-TERM (2025), economic activity is expected to expand at a moderate pace, with the September 2025 Summary of Economic Projections (SEP) indicating a median real GDP growth of 1.6%, revised slightly up to 1.7% in the December 2025 SEP (1)(2). Looking towards the MEDIUM-TERM (2026-2027), projections indicate an acceleration, with the December 2025 SEP raising the median real GDP growth forecast for 2026 significantly to 2.3% from 1.8% in September (2). This anticipated strength is attributed to resilient consumer spending, continued robust business fixed investment (especially in AI and data centers), and supportive fiscal policy (3)(4)(5).
Despite this generally positive outlook, there is MEDIUM confidence, as Fed communications acknowledge considerable uncertainty. The Beige Books for October and November 2025 (6) reported mixed regional activity, often "little changed" or "slight softening," and noted elevated uncertainty weighing on activity, including from a prolonged government shutdown. Chair Powell himself has stated that forecasting is "very difficult" and that forecasters would "honestly say 'no'" to having great confidence in their forecasts (7).
2. Fed-Implied Inflation Trajectory
The Fed appears to be preparing for an inflation DISINFLATION path, with a gradual return to the 2% target, but acknowledges near-term STICKY elements. The December 2025 SEP (2) projects PCE inflation to be 2.9% in 2025 and 2.4% in 2026, eventually reaching 2.0% by 2028. Core PCE inflation follows a similar path, projected at 3.0% for 2025 and 2.5% for 2026 (2).
The prevailing persistence vs transitory framing views the impact of tariffs on goods prices as primarily a "one-time shift in the price level" rather than an "ongoing inflation problem" (7)(8)(3). These tariff effects are expected to peak in Q1 2026 and subside in H2 2026 (3). Excluding tariff effects, core PCE inflation is assessed to be "much closer to 2 percent" (4). While shelter inflation is expected to decline, core nonhousing services inflation has moved sideways (9).
The Fed maintains a sensitivity to upside risks for inflation, citing the uncertain magnitude and persistence of tariff effects and the possibility of longer-term inflation expectations becoming unanchored (10). However, most measures of longer-term inflation expectations remain "well anchored" around 2% (7)(8)(3).
3. Fed-Implied Labour Market Trajectory
The Fed appears to be preparing for a LOOSENING labor market. Official data and various indicators suggest job gains have "slowed significantly" and the unemployment rate has "edged up," reaching 4.4% by September 2025 and 4.5% by December 2025 (11)(3)(5). The SEP projects the unemployment rate to stabilize at 4.5% for 2025 and 4.4% for 2026 (2).
The speed of adjustment is described as "gradual cooling" (8), reflecting both declining labor force participation and lower immigration, alongside a softening in labor demand (8)(3). The adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) is noted as a factor in reducing labor needs and replacing entry-level positions (7)(8)(3). While layoffs remain low, hiring is also low, indicating a less dynamic labor market (5).
There is a HIGH degree of concern expressed regarding the labor market's fragility. Vice Chair Bowman explicitly stated that the labor market has "become more fragile" and poses "the greater risk" (4). The Beige Books consistently report "muted" labor demand and increased employer caution (6). Wage growth remains modest overall, though some sectors face upward pressure due to specific skill shortages or health insurance costs (6).
4. Dominant Risk Narrative
The dominant risk narrative has shifted to emphasize DOWNSIDE GROWTH/LABOUR RISK, while acknowledging ongoing UPSIDE INFLATION RISK. Since September 2025, FOMC statements have consistently highlighted that "downside risks to employment have risen" (11)(12)(14). Chair Powell articulated this as a shift in the "balance of risks" that warrants a move to a more neutral policy stance (7)(8). Vice Chair Bowman explicitly identified the labor market's fragility as the "greater risk" (4).
Evidence of asymmetric preparation is clear in the Fed's proactive policy adjustments. The Committee has undertaken a sequence of interest rate cuts (75 basis points since September 2025) and decided to conclude balance sheet runoff, initiating Treasury bill purchases to maintain ample reserves (14)(5). These actions are framed as "risk-management cuts" designed to "preemptively limit the risk of greater and more persistent damage to the labor market" (7)(4). While upside risks to inflation persist, the Fed views them as "less likely to materialize in a sustained way," expecting tariff effects to be transitory (4). The coexistence of strong equity markets and struggling lower-income households (a "K-shaped" economy) is also a recognized risk (8)(3).
5. Evidence Map (Concise)
- Key SEP signals
- 2 December 2025 SEP: Upward revisions to 2026 real GDP growth (2.3% from 1.8%). Unemployment rate stable for 2025-2026 (4.5%, 4.4%). PCE inflation outlook slightly lowered for 2025-2026 (2.9%, 2.4%). Federal Funds Rate median stable at 3.6% for 2025 and 3.4% for 2026.
- 1 September 2025 SEP: Diffusion index shows strong weighting towards downside risks for unemployment and upside risks for PCE inflation.
- Key Beige Book themes
- 6 October & November 2025 Beige Books: Report "little changed" to "slight softening" in overall economic activity, with varied regional performance. Consumer spending declined, particularly for lower-income households. Labor markets described as "gradually cooling" with muted demand, increased layoffs/attrition, and persistent shortages for skilled/immigrant labor. Prices continue moderate increases due to tariffs and services costs, with mixed pass-through. Elevated uncertainty from government shutdown and policy changes.
- Key language or framing from statements or speeches
- 11 September 17, 2025 FOMC Statement: "Downside risks to employment have risen."
- 8 October 29, 2025 Chair Powell Press Conference: Framed policy cuts as "risk management" due to labor market fragility, tariff-induced inflation as "one-time shift." Noted "K-shaped" economy.
- 12 October 29, 2025 FOMC Statement: Concluded balance sheet reduction by December 1.
- 3 December 10, 2025 Chair Powell Press Conference: Confirmed upward revision to 2026 GDP due to consumer spending, AI investment, and productivity. Stated policy rate is now in "broad range of plausible estimates of neutral."
- 5 January 16, 2026 Vice Chair Jefferson Speech: Expressed "cautious optimism," emphasizing labor market stabilization and inflation returning to target, with current policy in "neutral range."
- 4 January 16, 2026 Vice Chair Bowman Speech: Highlighted labor market "fragility" as "the greater risk," justifying policy rate cuts to limit labor market damage.
- 13 August 22, 2025 Statement on Longer-Run Goals: Reaffirmed "balanced approach" when dual mandate goals are in tension.
6. Missing or Incomplete Inputs
No material Fed projection inputs are missing.
This module provides projection conditioning only.
It does not determine policy, timing, or behavioural feasibility.